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Abstract. Ranking systems such as those in product review sites and
recommender systems usually use ratings to rank favorite items based
on both their quality and popularity. Since higher ranked items are more
likely selected and yield more revenues for their owners, providers of
unpopular and low quality items have strong incentives to strategically
manipulate their ranking. This paper analyzes the adversary cost for
manipulating these rankings in a variety of scenarios. Particularly, we
analyze and compare the adversarial cost to attack ranking systems that
use various trust measures to detect and eliminate malicious ratings to
systems that use no such trust mechanism. We provide theoretical re-
sults showing the relation between the capability of the trust mecha-
nism in detecting malicious ratings and the minimum adversarial cost
for successfully changing the ranking. Furthermore, we study the impact
of sharing trust information between ranking systems to the adversarial
cost. It is proved that sharing information between two ranking systems
on common user identities and malicious behaviors detected can signifi-
cantly increase the minimum adversarial cost to successfully attack the
two systems under certain assumptions. The numerical evaluation of our
results shows that the estimated adversary cost for manipulating the
item ranking can be made significant when proper trust mechanisms are
employed or combined.
1 Introduction
Ranking has become a popular and important feature of online business appli-
cations. A ranking system enables users to rate their favorite items based on
item quality and also according to their own preferences. Items may represent
services, products, sellable articles, digital content, or search results in differ-
ent application scenarios. To facilitate the searching of users, these ratings are
then used to rank a large number of items of the same category according to
both their quality and popularity, e.g. ranking of digital content in social sites
(Digg.com) or products in recommender systems (Amazon.com).
The impact of user online opinions on sales and profits is significant [1]. One
can reasonably expect that items with higher ranks are more likely to be selected
2by clients and thus to produce more value for their providers. However, there
is a clear incentive for owners of unpopular and bad items to employ malicious
identities to promote (i.e. “ballot-stuff”) their own items and demote (i.e. “bad-
mouth”) competing ones to generate higher revenue. In real applications these
issues are inevitable. For example, sellers can pay people for posting positive
reviews on their products, as in [2] where Amazon reviews are bought with 65
cents each. Botnets can even be hired to conduct the attacks [3].
Regarding manipulation-resistance of ranking metrics, there have been a
large number of works on studying resistance of Web page ranking algorithms,
such as by throttling Web spam via link structure and link credibility analy-
sis [4, 5]. These works are applicable to large scale ranking systems that sort
Web pages based on various criteria, such link quality and credibility of provider
sites [6,7]. The application of trust mechanisms [8,9] to improve the robustness
of a ranking system under adversarial attacks, such as ballot-stuffing and bad-
mouthing is also well-explored [5,10]. However, the impact of the capability of a
trust mechanism in detecting malicious ratings to the robustness of the ranking
system using such mechanisms has not been analyzed yet.
To this end, in this paper, we present an analytical approach to evaluate
the robustness of a ranking system under attack by an intelligent adversary
with limited resources. Particularly, we analyze the cost of an adversary to suc-
cessfully manipulate the item ranking in smaller-scale systems, such as product
review sites and recommender systems. The adversarial cost is estimated as the
number of identities and ratings that need to be employed by the adversary to
successfully change the ranks of specific targeted items. In practice, this cost
may represent the cost of hiring people or botnets to post fake ratings on the
targets [3]. We compare the adversary costs when specific trust mechanisms to
eliminate biased ratings are employed or not. Thus, we provide theoretical re-
sults showing the relation between the capability of the trust mechanism being
used to detect malicious ratings and the adversarial cost to attack a ranking
system. By numerically evaluating our results, we show that the improvement in
robustness of a ranking system using a trust mechanism with a given capability
to detect dishonest ratings can be significant under certain assumptions.
Moreover, we extend our analysis to quantify the adversarial cost in a more
interesting scenario where two similar ranking systems share information regard-
ing common users and the detection of malicious ratings. This scenario is realistic
for the following reasons. On one hand, building applications that allows better
collection and exchanges of information on user activities with similar systems
is an emerging trend adopted by many research and commercial initiatives, e.g.,
the on-going standardization of the OASIS committee on information exchange
across reputation systems1 and the OpenSocial API for better sharing informa-
tion among online social networks. Commercial initiatives that are capable of
collecting user activities across virtual communities are already available, some
1 www.oasis-open.org/committees/orms
3examples of which include Spokeo2 and Reputation Defender3. On the other
hand, malicious providers may want to publish their items in different systems
for higher profits. To reduce cost, an adversarial provider may reuse a number
of malicious identities across systems when posting bogus votes to manipulate
the ranking of their items in different systems, e.g., by hiring only one botnet.
Hence, by sharing the detection of malicious behaviors across systems, more ma-
licious users are discovered and eliminated, which in turn helps to improve the
robustness of the participating systems. We prove that, under certain realistic
assumptions, two systems with shared information for common user identities
and detected malicious ratings by trust mechanisms can significantly increase
the attack cost of an adversary.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we
describe the problem of ranking items in the presence of malicious raters. In
Section 3, we analytically derive the minimum cost for the adversary to manip-
ulate the ranking of the items under a trust mechanism that detects malicious
votes with a certain effectiveness. In Section 4, we prove that the adversarial
cost for manipulating the ranking of items increases when two systems exchange
information regarding user identities and detected malicious ratings. Our results
are numerically evaluated in Section 5, in Section 6 we discuss the related work,
and conclude in Section 7.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a ranking system with a set S of items (e.g. products or services),
each having a binary static quality (good or bad). A user may rate the quality
of the item after buying it. Let U be the set of honest raters. We denote as
r(u, s) ∈ {1, 0,−1} the value of a rating from a user u ∈ U for an item s ∈ S,
where a value r(u, s) = 0 implies that u does not rate s. In general, a user u ∈ U
reports accurately the item quality. However, due to some observation noise, u
may rate an item inaccurately with a small probability 0 < ε ¿ 1, e.g. a bad
item is rated positively or vice versa. The items are ranked by their quality and
popularity score (QP-score) f(s) defined for any item s ∈ S as:s
f(s) =
∑
u∈U
r(u, s) , (1)
where a rating r(u, s) is counted only once for each user u and each item s.
Let S = {si, 1 ≤ i ≤ M} be the set of all items, where si has an original
rank i according to formula (1). Intuitively, i < j, or the item si is said to have a
higher rank than sj iff f(si) > f(sj). This simple metric f(.) counting number of
positive and negative votes on an item is often used in existing systems to rank
items in terms of their quality and popularity and we employ it for convenience.
The use of more sophisticated scoring formulas, e.g. considering rating time and
credibility of the raters, actually belongs to those trust-based ranking functions
2 www.spokeo.com
3 www.reputationdefender.com
4that we will consider later on. Also, our analytical approach to estimate the
adversarial cost in this paper can be applied with arbitrary ranking functions,
though the result would be different, and no closed-form solution can be easily
obtained.
An adversary wants to boost the rank of an item sk to the highest rank
k∗ = 1 < k. Herein, we use k∗ = 1 to reduce the number of notations, but it
is trivial to extend our analysis for any k∗ < k. (Note that the same analytical
reasoning could also be applied to the case that the adversary wanted to raise
or lower the rank of a set of items instead of a single one.) In order to promote
item sk, the adversary uses a set D of malicious user identities to post positive
ratings on sk and negative ratings on competing items, i.e. si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1. The
total number of malicious ratings is C, and the cost of the adversary includes
both components C and |D|.
For each item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, denote as Ui and Di the set of honest and
malicious users who rate on si, respectively. The number of ratings on an item
si by a honest and malicious users are respectively xi =| Ui | and yi = |Di|.
Depending the true quality (high or low) of si, the majority of xi honest ratings
on si would be positive or negative. Naturally,
⋃k
i=1Di = D and
∑k
i=1 yi = C,
since ratings items ranked lower than sk does not help boosting the rank of the
target item sk but increase the cost of the adversary. Note that the adversary
can observe, prior to his attack, Ui of any item si (i.e. the number of ratings for
service i) and can estimate the numerical score of every item, apart from the
ranking. Knowing the actual scores of the items is necessary for the adversary
to derive D and C, in order to strategically change the ranking of items.
The system designer wants the ranking to reflect the true quality and popu-
larity of items, so that the system to be useful to its users. One naive approach
that is often followed would be to simply ignore the presence of a possible ad-
versary, and the items to be ranked according to the QP-score of each item s as
in (1): fN (s) =
∑
u∈U∪D r(u, s). To restrict the effect of the malicious ratings
posted by the adversary, a preferable approach is to rank items based on the
following trust-based QP score:
fT (s) =
∑
u∈U∪D
r(u, s)t(u, s) , (2)
where 0 ≤ t(u, s) ≤ 1 is the estimated trustworthiness of the rating r(u, s) and
it is measured differently based on the trust management approach employed.
We focus in the comparison of the optimal cost of the adversary in terms of its
minimal numbers of ratings C and malicious identities |D|, to successfully boost
the rank of the item sk in many situations where different QP scores fT (s), fN (s)
are used to rank items, and under different possible approaches to evaluate the
trustworthiness of ratings. Note that without the adversary D = ∅, we have
fT (s) = fN (s) = f(s). Since r(u, s) can be considered as a random variable, i.e.,
subject to observation noise or the honesty of the rating user, we estimate the
expected values E[f(s)], E[fN (s)], E[fT (s)], whenever the exact rating r(u, s) is
unknown. Regarding the quality of the other items, we only consider the most
important case where items in the competing set si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 are of good
5quality (and thus they should be highly ranked for the benefit of the users). The
other cases can be similarly analyzed.
3 Adversarial Cost under Trust-based Ranking
3.1 Uniform Detection Capability of Malicious Ratings
Consider the system of Section 2, with approximate xi = |Ui| honest (both
positive and negative) ratings on an item si, i = 1, ..., |S|. With the trust-based
QP-score (2) as a ranking metric, Proposition 1 gives the minimal adversarial
cost to manipulate the ranking.
Proposition 1. Suppose the system uses a trust mechanism that detects mali-
cious ratings on any item with a uniform probability 0 < γ < 1. It is possible to
design a ranking system in which the minimal adversarial cost, in expectation, to
boost the rank of an item from k to 1 includes the cost of creating |DT | identities
and posting CT = |DT | ratings on the target item sk, where:
|DT | = (x1 + xk)1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ (3)
Proof. First, we prove that there exists a simple trust management approach
that detects malicious ratings on any item with a probability 0 < γ < 1. The
following naive trust management approach to define the trustworthiness t(u, s)
of a rating satisfies such a requirement (see Fig. 1):
– A trusted rater e is used to monitor the quality of a randomly selected set
of items E ⊆ S, where |E| = γ|S|.
– For any u ∈ U ∪ D, if there exists some item s ∈ S such that the ratings
r(u, s)r(e, s) 6= 0, r(u, s) 6= r(e, s), we define t(u, s) = 0.
– For each of the remaining ratings r(u, s), the trustworthiness is propor-
tional to the number of ratings with the same value. Formally, t(u, s) =
|Ut(s)|/|U(s)|, where U(s) ⊆ U ∪D is the group of users who rate on s, and
Ut(s) ⊆ U(s) is the users with ratings r(u, s) on s.
{sk*...si... sk}
Ui = all honest users rating on si 
-1 1
Di = all cheating users rating on si 
Li = cheaters detected
-11
S = all items
Di - Li= undetected cheaters 
e
trusted rater
E=items monitored by 
trusted rater
1 -1 1
sk
si
sj
u u
Fig. 1. Detection unfair ratings on items by using a trusted rater.
6Apparently, the above trust mechanism can detect malicious ratings on any
item s ∈ S with a probability γ, at the cost of the system designer evaluating
|E| = γ|S| items to learn of their true quality. Of course there may exist other
trust mechanisms that are more cost-efficient, i.e., require the evaluation of less
than γ|S| services for a given capability of detection γ, but designing such a
trust mechanism is out of the scope of this work.
Recall that Ui and Di are correspondingly the sets of honest and cheating
raters on si. The trust-based QP score of an item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is fT (si) =∑
u∈Ui∪Di r(u, si)t(u, si). To effectively boost the rank of sk, the adversary needs
to post at least yi negative ratings on each item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and at least
yk positive ratings on the item sk. The goal of the adversary is to ensure the
expected trust-based QP-score of the target item sk to be as high as that of
every other item of higher rank, i.e., E[fT (sk)] ≥ E[fT (si)], 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
Consider any item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1 with a good quality. Among honest users
Ui, a subset U ′i ⊆ Ui may give unfair (negative) ratings on si. A smaller subset
U ′′i ⊆ U ′i may be detected by the trust management approach as cheater (based
on erroneous ratings). Among those malicious users Di who rate si negatively
(to favor sk), a subset of them would be detected by the trust management
mechanism. Denote as Li ⊆ Di the set of malicious raters that are not detected.
Then, users in the group Pi = Ui − U ′i vote positively and those in the group
Ni = U ′i − U ′′i ∪ Li vote negatively on si. Note that Pi ∪Ni = Ui − U ′′i ∪ Li, as
in Fig. 2(a). The trustworthiness t(u, si) of a rating r(u, si) is estimated as:
• For u ∈ U ′′i ∪ (Di − Li) : t(u, si) = 0, i.e., users with erroneous observation
and malicious users are marked as cheaters.
• For u ∈ Pi = Ui−U ′i : t(u, si) = |Pi||Pi∪Ni| . Similarly, for u ∈ Ni = (U ′i−U ′′i )∪
Li, t(u, si) =
|Ni|
|Pi∪Ni| .
LiDi-Li
L2
Li (D2-L2) D2-L2
Ui
U2
U’i
U’’i
U2'U2'’
Di
D2 
LiDi-Li
Ui
U’i
U’’i
Di
(a) (b)
Dk
Z2 
Z
Dk2
(c)
Fig. 2. (a) Venn diagram of the set of malicious and honest users detected by a trust
mechanism. (b) The set of malicious and honest users detected by combining two trust
management mechanisms. (c) Different sets of malicious users used by the adversary.
Eliminating ratings with 0 trustworthiness, i.e., those of users in the shaded
parts of Fig. 2(a), the trust-based QP-score of any si ∈ S, i = 1, ..., k−1 becomes:
fT (si) =
∑
u∈Pi
1.
|Pi|
|Pi|+ |Ni| +
∑
u∈Ni
(−1) |Ni||Pi|+ |Ni| = |Pi| − |Ni|
Since with a probability γ, malicious ratings on any item will be detected by the
trust mechanism, we have:
• E[|U ′i |] = |Ui|ε = xiε, and E[|U ′′i |] = E(|U ′i |)γ = xiεγ.
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∑
u∈Di 1{u detected}] =
∑
u∈Di E[1{u detected}] = |Di|γ.
It follows that E|Li| = |Di|(1− γ) = yi(1− γ).
As a result E[|Pi|] = E[|Ui − U ′i |] = E[|Ui| − |U ′i |] = xi(1 − ε) and E[|Ni|] =
E|U ′i−U ′′i ∪Li| = E[|U ′i |−|U ′′i |+ |Li|] = xiε−xiεγ+yi(1−γ) = (1−γ)(xiε+yi).
Therefore, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1:
E[fT (si)] = E[|Pi|]−E[|Ni|] = xi(1−ε)− (1−γ)(xiε+yi) = xi(1−2ε+εγ)−yi(1−γ)
Similarly, for the target item sk, noting honest users mostly rate sk negatively
while malicious users rate it positively, we have:
E[fT (sk)] = −E[|Pk|]+E[|Nk|] = −xk(1−ε)+(1−γ)(xkε+yk) = −xk(1−2ε+εγ)+yk(1−γ)
The item sk has a higher rank than si iff E[fT (sk)] ≥ E[fT (si)], or:
yk + yi ≥ (xk + xi)1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ
The minimal number of ratings the adversary needs to insert into the system is
the solution of the following integer program:
CT = min{y1 + y2 + . . .+ yk}
s.t. yk + yi ≥ (xi + xk)(1− 2ε+ εγ)/(1− γ), i = 1, ..., k − 1 (4)
where all xi, yi are non-negative integers, xis are fixed. One can also verify that
as the first k − 1 items are assumedly good, the number of ratings on them
satisfies xi ≥ xi+1, for i = 1, ..., k − 2. This program has the following complete
set of solutions4:
yk = (x1 + xk)(1− 2ε+ εγ)/(1− γ)− d; y1 = d; yi = 0, 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
where 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax = (x1 − x2)(1− 2ε+ εγ)/(1− γ) (5)
Each solution above (for each 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax ) requires the adversary to post
the same total number of ratings CT =
∑k
i=1 yi = (x1+xk)
1−2ε+εγ
1−γ . For each d,
a corresponding attack strategy is to create at least max{CT − d, d} = CT − d
identities5. Each of these CT −d identities posts a positive rating on the boosted
item sk. The adversary also uses d identities to post negative ratings on the
highest ranked item s1.
With the attack strategy of d = 0, the adversary needs to create CT identities,
and the probability the attack is successful is 1 − γ. For d > 0, the adversary
needs to create fewer (CT − d) identities, since he can use the same user to
post ratings on both items s1 and sk. However, a strategy with d > 0 leads to
higher chance that these identities are detected, and the probability that the
attack is successful in this case becomes smaller, i.e., (1− γ)2 < 1− γ. Formally,
considering the expected gain and the risk of the adversary being detected, we
can prove that the utility of the adversary is maximized at d = 0 in any of the
4 For clarity, we omit rounding operators ‖.‖ from the right side of equations (5).
5 Without loss of generality, we assume that x1+xk ≥ 2(x1−x2), hence CT −dmax ≥
dmax and thus max{CT − d, d} = CT − d.
8two cases (1) γ is within a certain range or (2) the gain of the adversary if the
attack is success is very large compared to its cost of creating dmax malicious
identities. The proof is skipped due to space limitation. If we assume the case
that the adversary cares most about the probability of success of the attack,
the optimal strategy of the adversary is when d = 0, which incurs the following
cost of creating at least |DT | = (x1 + xk) 1−2ε+εγ1−γ identities and posting at least
CT = |DT | ratings on the item sk, as claimed by the proposition. uunionsq
In this paper, we refrain from presenting the analysis for the general case
where an item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k has a true quality qi ∈ {1, 0} (high or low) for
clarity reasons. This general result can be obtained by similar reasoning and
by replacing the factor x1 + xk in (3) with (−1)1−q1x1 − (−1)1−qkxk. Also by
analogy, one can verify that the adversarial cost for promoting the target item
to a desired rank k∗ < k is obtained by (3) after replacing x1 with xk∗ .
Following immediately from Proposition 1, we have an estimate of the extent
of rank manipulation that can be done by an adversary.
Corollary 1. If the system uses a trust mechanism that can detect malicious
ratings on any item with probability 0 < γ < 1, an adversary with capability to
create at most |D| identities and posts C ratings may manipulate the rank of a
favorite item from the origin k to the highest rank k∗ ≤ k defined by:
k∗ =
k
min
k′=1
{k′ : (xk′ + xk)1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ ≤ min(C, |D|)} (6)
By similar reasoning, we obtain another result on the minimal adversarial
cost when no trust mechanism is employed in the system (see Proposition 2).
Proposition 2. In a system with no trust management mechanism to detect
malicious users and eliminate their ratings, the minimal cost of the adversary to
boost an item with rank k to rank 1 includes:
• The cost to create |D| = (x2 + xk)(1− 2ε) identities.
• The cost to post C = (x1 + xk)(1− 2ε) ratings on the two items s1 and sk.
The optimal attack strategy is to post dmax = (x1 − x2)(1− 2ε) negative ratings
on the top item s1 and post C − dmax positive ratings on the target item sk.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 for γ = 0. The difference is in the
optimal attack strategy of the adversary. If the system uses no trust mechanism
to detect malicious users and eliminate their ratings, the optimal strategy of the
adversary to boost an item with rank k to rank 1 is attained at d = dmax , for
which the adversary needs to create only C − dmax identities and uses them to
vote negatively for s1 and rate positively on the target item sk.
From Proposition 2, we can also estimate to which extent an adversary with
a fixed cost may manipulate the rank of his or her favorite items (Corollary 2).
Corollary 2. Consider a system with no trust management mechanism to de-
tect malicious users and eliminate their ratings. An adversary with capability to
create at most |D| identities and posts C ratings to the system may manipulate
the rank of its favorite item from k to the highest rank k∗ ≤ k defined by:
k
∗
= max{
k
min
k′=1
{k′ : (xk′+1 + xk)(1− 2ε) ≤ |D|},
k
min
k′=1
{k′ : (xk′ + xk)(1− 2ε) ≤ C}} (7)
9Compared between the cost in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, using a
trust management mechanism that detects malicious ratings on any item with a
probability γ would increase the minimal adversarial cost by some magnitudes:
|DT |/|D| ' (x1 + xk)(1− 2ε+ εγ)
(x2 + xk)(1− 2ε)(1− γ) > 1 (8)
CT /C ' 1− 2ε+ εγ
(1− 2ε)(1− γ) > 1 (9)
Our analysis is general as the notion of γ include the capability of the trust
mechanism to detect malicious on any item. There may exist other trust mecha-
nisms that are more efficient in terms of guaranteeing a higher detection probabil-
ity γ. These mechanisms might consider the reputation of the raters, credibilities
of the item providers, and the correlation of ratings among raters to each others,
etc. Designing such trust mechanism is, however, orthogonal to our work.
The cost of attacking the system also strongly depends on the set of votes
by honest users, i.e., xi. In systems where honest users outnumber the mali-
cious users deployed by the adversary, manipulation of the trust-based ranking
is much more costly to the adversary. Existing techniques to restrict the number
of identities created by the adversary can be easily integrated to our analytical
framework to restrict the capability of the adversary to manipulate the ranking.
3.2 Non-Uniform Detection Capability of Malicious Ratings
Generally, the probability that the trust mechanism detects malicious ratings on
different items may be non uniformed. For example, the trust mechanism may
focus more on protecting of popular (and usually higher ranked) items, thereby
increasing the probability of detecting unreliable ratings on these items. Let γi
be the probability that malicious ratings on an item si ∈ S are detected and
eliminated. As a generalization of the analysis in Section 3.1, the optimal cost of
the adversary to successfully manipulate the rank of the item sk is the solution
to the following integer program:
Cext = min{y1 + y2 + . . .+ yk}
s.t. yk(1− γk) + yi(1− γi) ≥ xi(1− 2ε+ εγi) + xk(1− 2ε+ εγk) 4= φi, i = 1, ..., k − 1
where all 0 < γi < 1 are fixed, all xi are fixed non-negative integers, and xi ≥
xi+1, for i = 1, ..., k − 2.
The probabilities γi are inherent to the trust mechanism, possibly determined
by the system designer, while unknown to the adversary. The solution to the
above optimization problem is the lower bound of the cost of the adversary. It
is also our interest to evaluate which setting of γ1, ..., γk, ..., γ|S| would result in
a higher minimal cost of the adversary. Finding closed-form solutions for these
cases is non-trivial and thus it is done numerically in Section 5.
4 The Benefits of Sharing Trust across Ranking Systems
This section presents the analysis of the adversarial cost in a system that uses
an open trust management approach for detection and elimination of malicious
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ratings. That is, the system exchanges information on the identities of malicious
users detected with another ranking system. The identification of common users
(in a privacy-preserving way) can be done via alias detection and entity resolu-
tion methods, e.g., based on credential attributes of the users. This problem is,
however, orthogonal to the current work and thus is not further discussed. Let
S2 be the item set of the second system. Given any item s′j ∈ S2, define U2j the
set of honest users with ratings on s′j , and U2 =
⋃
s′j∈S2 U2j . Also, let D2j be
the set of malicious users with ratings on s′j , and also define D2 =
⋃
s′j∈S2D2j .
Assume that the second system uses another trust management approach
that can detect malicious ratings on any item with a probability 0 < γ2 < 1. In
this paper, we assume that the two ranking systems are designed to automatically
and reliably share the identities of malicious users detected to each other, and the
system managers have low incentive to modify the software implementation to
tamper such information. Fair and reliable information sharing between systems
is an important issue yet beyond the scope of this paper.
For the case where two systems do not share any information, the adversary
would need a set of D users to post a minimal number of CT ratings to boost
his favorites item sk in the first system. Suppose that the goal of the adversary
when attacking the second system is to boost the rank of an item s′k2 ∈ S2 from
k2 to k∗2 = 1
6. Then, the adversary would use another set of malicious users D2
to post a minimal number of C ′T ratings on his favorite items sk2 in the second
system. According to the analysis in Section 3.1:
CT = (xk + x1)
1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ =| D | and C
′
T = (x
′
k2 + x
′
1)
1− 2ε+ εγ2
1− γ2 =| D2 |(10)
where x′i, i = 1, ..., k2 have similar meanings to those of the first system.
Suppose that the adversary is able to create up to N =| D ∪D2 | identities
in two systems for its malicious purposes. It is required that N > max{CT , C ′T },
otherwise with allN identities the adversary is still unable to attack both systems
successfully. We will evaluate the benefit of sharing information between two
systems where such sharing is beneficial to both. That happens if the adversary
does not have enough resources and needs to use a certain number of identities
in both systems for its attacks, i.e., when N < CT +C ′T . Under this restriction,
the adversary would use CT among N identities to post CT ratings on the
first system. The posting of C ′T ratings in the second system will be done by
employing: (1) the unused N −CT identities; (2) CT +C ′T −N among those CT
identities already used in the first system.
Hence, the cost of the adversary in case of no information sharing is:
• The cost of creating N identities, where max{CT , C ′T } ≤ N ≤ CT + C ′T .
• The cost of posting CT + C ′T ratings in both systems.
When the two systems share trust evaluation results, the adversarial cost is:
• The same cost of N identities as in the case of not sharing information.
• The cost of posting RT̂ ratings, which would be defined later on.
6 Again, k∗2 = 1 reduces the notations without loss of generality of the analysis.
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We want to analyze how the cost of the adversary in the case of sharing trust
evaluation result differs from the case of not sharing any information, i.e., to
quantify RT̂ − CT − C ′T .
Denote τi =| Ui ∩ U2 |, 1 ≤ i ≤ k as the number of honest users who post
ratings on si and also appear in the second system. We may approximate that
τi =| Ui ∩ U2 |≈ τ/ | S |, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where τ is the number of common honest
users who post ratings in both systems. Similarly define τ ′i =| U2i ∩ U |≈ τ/ |
S2 |, 1 ≤ i ≤ k2 the number of honest users who post ratings on s′i ∈ S2 and
also appear in the first system. The following main result gives us an estimation
of the benefit of sharing information between the two systems.
Proposition 3. Consider two ranking systems with capabilities γ, γ2 of detec-
tion malicious ratings, where 0 < γ ≤ γ2 < 1. Assume ∆ be the number of
identities the adversary needs to reuse in two systems, in the best case for the
adversary, we have:
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ min{(xk + x1)
1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ , (x
′
k2
+ x
′
1)
1− 2ε+ εγ2
1− γ2
} (11)
If the two systems share trust evaluation information to each other, then the
difference of the adversary cost to attack the two systems between two cases of
sharing vs. non-sharing of information is bounded below by:
RT̂ − CT − C′T >
∆γ
1− γ −
εγ2(τk + τ1)(1− 2ε+ εγ)
(1− γ)2 −
εγ(τ ′k2 + τ
′
1)(1− 2ε+ εγ2)
(1− γ2)2
(12)
Proof. We provide here a sketch of the proof (the full proof can be found in [11]).
Let zi =| Di ∩ D2 |≤ yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k be the number of malicious raters who
appear in both systems and rate an item si ∈ S (of the first system). Similarly
denote z′j =| D2j ∩ D |≤ y′j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k2 the number of cheating users present
in both systems and rate an item s′j ∈ S2 (of the second system). Proceed as in
Proposition 1, the minimal number of ratings CT̂ by the adversary to successfully
attack the first systems is the solution to the following integer program:
CT̂ = min{y1 + y2 + ...+ yk} subject to:
yk + yi ≥ (xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi))1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ + (zk + zi)γ2, i = 1, ..., k − 1
yi ≥ zi, i = 1, ..., k
where xj , yj , τj , zj , j = 1, ..., k are non-negative integers, all xi, τi, zi, i = 1, ...k is
fixed, xi ≤ xj , for i ≤ j, i, j = 1, ..., k − 1.
For i = 1, ...k, define gi = (xk+xi− εγ2(τk+ τi)) 1−2ε+εγ1−γ − (zk+ zi)(1− γ2).
One may verify that any solution of the above program results in the same
optimal number of ratings CT̂ = max{0,maxk−1i=1 gi}+
∑k
i=1 zi.
Similar to the previous section, if we assume that the adversary cares most
about the probability of success of the attack, the optimal attack strategy is:
• for the item sk: the adversary uses a set of users Dk from the first system
and zk identities from the second system to post ŷk =| Dk | +zk ratings on
sk. We have | Dk |= max{0,maxk−1i=1 gi}, and thus CT̂ =| Dk | +
∑k
i=1 zi.
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• for the items si, i = 1, ..., k − 1: the adversary uses zi identities from the
second system to post zi ratings on each si.
The set of malicious users to be used by the adversary in the first system is
then D = Dk ∪ Z, where Z ⊆ D2 is set of identities borrowed from the set of
malicious users D2 in the second system. These borrowed identities are used by
the adversary to post a total of
∑k
i=1 zi ratings on those items si, i = 1, ..., k.
Likewise, the set of malicious users in the second system is D2 = Dk2∪Z2, where
Z2 ⊆ D is set of identities borrowed from the first system to rate on items in
the second system. Dk2 is the set of malicious users who are only present in the
second system and rate the target item s′k2 ∈ S2.
The set of malicious users used by the adversary to attack both systems is
thus DT̂ = Dk ∪Z ∪Dk2 ∪Z2. Fig. 2(c) illustrates the relation among different
sets Dk, Z, Z2, Dk2 . Clearly, the malicious set DT̂ is smallest iff Z ⊆ Dk2 and
Z2 ⊆ Dk. That is, the same malicious users in one system, e.g., Dk2 , are used
to rate items in the other system, e.g., to rate item si ∈ S, i = 1, ..., k. Under
such a situation, the total minimal number of identities the adversary needs to
create in the two systems is | DT̂ |=| Dk | + | Dk2 |.
Similarly, the minimal number of ratings to be posted in the second system
is C ′
T̂
=| Dk2 | +
∑k2
i=1 z
′
i. Thus the total cost of the adversary to attack both
systems includes two cost: (1) to create | DT̂ | identities and (2) to post RT̂ =
CT̂ + C
′
T̂
ratings in the two systems. Given a fixed number of identities N , the
goal of the adversary is to determine the number of common users zi ≥ 0, z′j ≥
0, i = 1, ..., k, j = 1, ..., k2 such that RT̂ is minimized. In other words:
RT̂ = min{| Dk | + | Dk2 | +
k∑
i=1
zi +
k2∑
j=1
z′j} subject to: | DT̂ |=| Dk | + | Dk2 |= N
where | Dk |= max{0, k−1max
i=1
{(xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi))1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ − (zk + zi)(1− γ2)}}
and | Dk2 |= max{0, max
1≤i≤k2−1
{(x′k2 + x′i − εγ(τ ′k + τ ′i))
1− ε+ 2εγ2
1− γ2 − (z
′
k + z
′
i)(1− γ)}}
Solving this program give usRT̂ ≥ − Nγ1−γ+maxk−1i=1 { fi1−γ }+maxk2−1j=1 {
f ′j
1−γ }, where
for simplicity we define fi
4
= (xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi)) 1−2ε+εγ1−γ , i = 1, ..., k− 1 and
f ′i
4
= (x′k2 + x
′
i − εγ(τ ′k2 + τ ′i)) 1−2ε+εγ21−γ2 , i = 1, ..., k2 − 1.
Since max{CT , C ′T } ≤ N < CT + C ′T , there are at least ∆ = CT + C ′T −N
identities used by the adversary in the two systems, where:
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ min{CT , C′T } = min{(xk + x1)1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ , (x
′
k2 + x
′
1)
1− 2ε+ εγ2
1− γ2 }
The bound of∆ is for the best case of the adversary, when he can estimate the
cost CT , C ′T to successfully attack the two systems. Given ∆ defined as above,
with basic computations we obtain:
RT̂ − CT − C′T >
∆γ
1− γ −
εγ2(τk + τ1)(1− 2ε+ εγ)
(1− γ)2 −
εγ(τ ′k2 + τ
′
1)(1− 2ε+ εγ2)
(1− γ2)2
(13)
and Proposition 3 follows naturally. uunionsq
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The cost difference RT̂ − CT − C ′T in Proposition 3 mostly depends on the
shortage of identities ∆ of the adversary. The fewer number of identities the
adversary has, the higher number of common identities it shall reuse across
the two systems, and the more ratings it needs to insert into both systems to
successfully manipulate the ranks of its favorite items. For most ∆ and where
the noise ε is negligible, it is apparent that RT̂ −CT +C ′T > 0, or the adversarial
cost to manipulate the ranking in both systems in the case of sharing trust
information between the two systems is higher than the adversarial cost CT +C ′T
where no information is shared. The capabilities of the two trust mechanisms
in detecting malicious ratings, i.e. the probability γ, γ2 also play an important
rule in increasing this total adversarial cost. The sharing of information, however,
may also lead to some false positives when estimating common users as cheating.
This observation noise however plays a minor role, as the two negative terms on
the right hand side of (12) are small, given small values of ε. Note that this cost
difference RT̂ − CT − C ′T is estimated in the worst case where the adversary
knows the common users (τi, τ ′i) and is aware of the effectiveness of the two
system at detecting malicious activities (γ, γ2) to develop an optimal strategy of
placement malicious entities and ratings in the two systems.
5 Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we numerically evaluate our results. All items including the target
items are assumed to be good (but differ in popularity), which can be proven as
even less costly for the adversary to promote them, and with the least difference
between the number of ratings between items (hence the minimum adversarial
cost is the lowest possible). The estimates are for ε = 0.05 and M = |S| = 100
items. There are xi = M − i honest ratings for each item with rank 1 ≤ i ≤
M . Fig. 3 evaluates the increase in the minimal adversarial cost |DT |/|D| with
respect to uniform detection capabilities γ of the trust management and with
various values of the original rank k and desired rank k∗ < k of the target item.
We observe that even in this pessimistic scenario, the use of a trust mechanism
with reasonable detection capability γ = 0.5 doubles the adversarial cost to
manipulate the rankings in terms of the number of identities, irrespective of the
original rank of the target item. The increase in adversarial cost by the number
of malicious ratings CT /C has a similar trend. Also, the raise of the adversarial
cost for promoting the lowest ranked item can be achieved by increasing the
detection capability of the trust mechanism being used γ (Fig. 3).
Next, we consider the impact to the minimal adversarial cost of a trust mech-
anism with non-uniform detection capabilities γ. For simplicity, we assume linear
ascending and descending γ functions with respect to the item original rank and
numerically solve the linear program of Section 3.2. The adversarial identities
and ratings ratios (|DT |/|D| and CT /C respectively) with respect to the initial
item rank are depicted in Fig. 4. Thus, an ascending γ distribution increases the
minimum adversarial cost for promoting lower ranked services. Also, considering
multiple different γ distributions (Fig. 5), we observe that a trust mechanism
that focuses more on detecting malicious ratings on lower ranked items increases
the minimal adversarial cost to promote their ranking.
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Fig. 3. Identities cost by a trust mechanism with different detection capabilities γ: (a)
the target has variable original rank k and desired rank k∗ = 1; and (b) the target has
original rank k =M/2 and variable desired rank k∗.
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Fig. 4. Identities (a) and ratings (b) cost ratio for promoting a service with rank k with
or without a trust mechanism employing an ascending or descending γ distribution.
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Fig. 5. Identities (a) and ratings (b) minimum cost for promoting a service initially
ranked last with different γ distributions.
The impact of sharing trust information to the overall robustness of the two
systems for an example case is given in Fig. 6, measured in the increase of
adversarial cost (the number of ratings the adversary needs to insert into both
systems). The two systems are assumed to use trust management mechanisms
with similar detection capabilities γ = γ2, have to similar item sets |S| = |S2| =
M with roughly τ = 10% common honest users. The measurements are done in
three representative cases where the target items have different original ranks in
the two systems. The estimates are based on Eq. (12) in the worst case scenario
with the least difference between the item popularity, xi = M − i, 1 ≤ i ≤
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Fig. 6. Impact of the trust information sharing to the increase of adversarial cost (in
log scale) where: (a) the (origin) rank of the target is average in both systems; (b) the
rank of the target in one system is high. The results in other cases are similar.
M,x′j =M−j, 1 ≤ j ≤M . Observe that the sharing of information between two
systems helps to significantly raise the total cost of the adversary to attack the
two systems, thus strengthening both systems significantly. The conditions for
this sharing of trust information to be beneficial to both systems, i.e., log(RT̂ −
CT−C ′T ) > 0 are: (1) the detection capabilities of the two systems are sufficiently
high, and (2) the resources of the adversary are limited, e.g., γ, γ2 > 0.5 and
∆ > 5 in the case of Fig. 6.
6 Related Work
The works most related to ours include existing research on resilience of Web
page ranking algorithms against Web spams, via link structure and credibility
analysis, namely [4, 5]. The use of trust and reputation mechanisms to mini-
mize the influence of adversarial attacks in ranking systems has also attracted
much effort [8, 9]. EigenTrust [12] presents a global trust metric to measure the
credibility to a node in a network based on inter-connecting links among nodes.
Other works, as [5], use reputation-based trust management techniques to im-
prove the robustness of ranking systems but with little analysis on the impact of
trust mechanisms to the adversarial cost for strategic manipulation the system.
A more recent work [10] studies vulnerabilities and attacks by an adversary with
a given cost to voting systems and propose defense mechanisms based on item
popularity. This work is different from ours as it only considers the binary vot-
ing result on item quality while our work is more general: we consider ranking
systems that use both popularity and quality of items as ranking metrics. We
also analyze and quantify the cost of targeted adversarial attacks to manipu-
late the rankings in different scenarios, where the systems use or combine trust
management mechanisms with different detection capabilities.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the minimum adversary cost to manipulate the ranking of
items in systems where a trust mechanism is employed for detecting unfair and
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biased ratings. We provide theoretical results showing the relation between the
capability of the trust mechanism being used to detect malicious ratings and
the minimum adversarial cost to successfully attack a ranking system. More-
over, we have proved that, under certain realistic assumptions, two systems with
shared information regarding common user identities and detections of malicious
ratings can significantly increase the minimum successful attack cost of an ad-
versary. The analytical framework in the paper can be extended to estimate the
robustness of more complex ranking score metrics against the adversary. Our
analysis indicates that the cost of the system designer to prevent attacks from
the adversary with a certain power, is related to the cost of implementing a trust
management mechanism with a certain capability of detecting malicious rating
behaviors, of which a more detailed treatment is subject to future work. It may
also be our interest to analyze the cost and the influence on the final ranking
result in presence of many competing adversaries with different powers.
References
[1] Chevalier, J.A., Mayzlin, D.: The effect of word of mouth on sales: Online book
reviews. Journal of Marketing Research 43 (2006)
[2] Parsa, A.: Belkins Development Rep is Hiring People to Write Fake Positive
Amazon Reviews. (2009)
[3] Namestnikov, Y.: The economics of Botnets, http://www.viruslist.com/analysis?
pubid=204792068. (2009)
[4] Caverlee, J., Webb, S., Liu, L., Rouse, W.B.: A parameterized approach to spam-
resilient link analysis of the web. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 20 (2009)
1422–1438
[5] Gyongyi, Z., Garcia-Molina, H., Pedersen, J.: Combating web spam with
trustrank. In: Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Very Large
Data Bases (VLDB). (2004) 271–279
[6] Page, L., Brin, S., Motwani, R., Winograd, T.: The pagerank citation ranking:
Bringing order to the web. Technical report, Stanford University (1998)
[7] Kleinberg, J.M.: Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment. J. ACM 46
(1999) 604–632
[8] Golbeck, J.: Trust on the world wide web: A survey. Foundations and Trends in
Web Science 1 (2006) 131–197
[9] Jøsang, A., Ismail, R., Boyd, C.: A survey of trust and reputation systems for
online service provision. Decis. Support Syst. 43 (2007) 618–644
[10] Feng, Q., Sun, Y., Liu, L., Yang, Y., Dai, Y.: Voting Systems with Trust Mecha-
nisms in Cyberspace: Vulnerabilities and Defenses. IEEE Transactions on Knowl-
edge and Data Engineering (2010)
[11] Vu, L.H., Papaioannou, T.G., Aberer, K.: Impacts of trust management and
information sharing to adversarial cost in ranking systems. Technical Report
LSIR-REPORT-2010-001, http://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/143071 (2010)
[12] Kamvar, S.D., Schlosser, M.T., Molina, H.G.: The EigenTrust algorithm for rep-
utation management in P2P networks. In: Proc. of WWW’03. (2003)
